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The Battle of San Francisco, also known as the Battle of Dolores, was a major battle in the Tarapacá Campaign of the War of the Pacific, fought on November 19, 1879, in the Peruvian department of Tarapacá. A Chilean army under Colonel Emilio Sotomayor had moved via Dolores rail road deep into Tarapacá and was encamped at San Francisco Saltpeter Office, about 30 kilometers south east of the port of Pisagua. Allied forces under General Juan Buendía launched an attack on Sotomayor's army. At the beginning, Bolivian General Carlos Villegas pressed the attack over a poorly defended battery right in the Chilean center and almost succeeded. Only the arrival of infantry support allowed Colonel José Domingo Amunátegui to hold the battery and his position. Also, the Allies struck with the intention of driving the Chilean defenders away from Dolores well. Buendía hoped to defeat Sotomayor's army before the anticipated arrival of Gen. Erasmo Escala with reinforcements from Hospicio. The allied battle columns became confused during the fierce fighting, and Sotomayor's men rejected the attack over its flanks and center. Colonel Ladislao Espinar was mortally wounded at San Francisco, while Gen. Villegas was wounded and captured, among other allied officers. The Allies were forced to retreat from the area, ending their hopes of sending the Chileans back to the sea. Also, Buendía lost a huge amount of war materiel such as cannons, ammunition and weapons The catastrophe for the Allies was the result of poor logistics, inefficient leadership and the unexpected desertion of the Bolivian Army under the half-hearted command of President Hilarión Daza, known as the ''Camarones betrayal''. ==Prelude== After the Chilean navy obtained a decisive victory at Angamos (October 8, 1879), Rafael Sotomayor, the Chilean Secretary of War, and General Erasmo Escala, Army's Commander in Chief, began the preparations for the invasion of the Tarapacá department. On November 2, the Chileans launched an amphibious operation at Pisagua and pushed the Allies offshore. It allowed to establish a beach head to transport equipment and soldiers. Also, the loss of Pisagua deprived Gen. Buendía of the only available escape route he had left, because Iquique was under blockade since the war broke out. In fact, Buendía was in a very dangerous position. He was obliged to retake Pisagua at all cost to re-open his line of communications. Au contraire, his only way out of Tarapacá would be marching to Arica through the Atacama Desert. To make things worse, the Allies were scattered all over the region. After defeated at Pisagua, Buendía retreated to Iquique where he joined Cáceres and Bustamante. Col. Pastor Dávila never moved from Pozo Almonte and Gen. Carlos Villegas went to Puerto Patillo. Another two divisions were between Pozo Almonte and Iquique, while Villamil retreated to Agua Santa. The Aroma Battalion was at Mejillones and the Vengadores Battalion was at Agua Santa. When the news of the Chilean victory reached Tacna, the Allies quickly held two war councils. In those, it was decided that Bolivian President, General Hilarión Daza, would drive his army to Tana, a few kilometers north of Pisagua, where he would join with Buendía and assume the command of the entire allied army. When reunited, Daza would attack Pisagua to regain the port. Two gunned trains transported Daza's troops and supplies to Arica, from where the march started on November 6. To reach the rendezvous point of Tana, the Bolivians should walk about 150 kilometers across the most arid desert on Earth. Therefore, President Prado advised Daza to march at night to keep troop's welfare. But what Prado didn't know was that Daza wasn't sure of his troop's loyalty. So he deliberately wore down his army. The men marched on daylight across the desert and were allowed to bring wine with them. When Daza reached Camarones, he had already lost 200 men. Using this as excuse, the column countermarched to Arica without meeting with Buendía. This is known until this day as the Camarones Betrayal. When Buendía was notified of the battle plan decided at Tacna, he began to gather his army. He left Iquique on November 5 with three battalions and moved north east, deep into the Tarapacá department. Buendía spent almost two weeks gathering his divisions, completing his army only by the 16, when he reached Agua Santa. The Allies marched to Negreiros on the 17, then turned north and advanced to Porvenir. From here Buendía would march to encounter Daza at Tana, passing through Santa Catalina. At 3 pm of November 19, the allied vanguard saw the Chilean army occupying San Francisco Hill. On the Chilean side, right after the victory of Pisagua, Lt. Colonel José Francisco Vergara proposed an immediate reconnaissance to scout for water supplies. Vergara with a cavalry detachment departed on November 5 following the railroad to Dolores saltpeter office, where Vergara found the installations and water machines in good condition. The next day, the detachment resumed its mission, and doing so annihilated two allied cavalry squadrons at Germania.〔 When Escala received Vergara's report, sent 3,500 men under Col. José Domingo Amunátegui to Dolores on November 7. The next day, Col. Martiniano Urriola with another 2,500 soldiers followed as reinforcements. Both columns joined at Dolores on November 10 and seized the water well and the nearby saltpeter office. Col. Emilio Sotomayor, brother of War Minister Sotomayor, arrived to Dolores and assumed command of the troops. Besides, he sent scouts to Jazpampa, Tana and Tiviliche looking for Daza. A cavalry scout spotted the allied advance over Dolores at 6 pm of November 18, near Agua Santa.〔Eckdahl, p. 330〕 Immediately, Sotomayor sent Col. Amunátegui with a regiment, two cavalry companies and one battery to Santa Catalina, about 6 kilometers south of Dolores. Two hours later, Col. Juan Martinez' Atacama Battalion was dispatched as reinforcement. Simultaneously, Col. Ricardo Castro was ordered to return from Jazpampa, where he was sent with 1,800 men to wait for Daza's army. Castro left in place the Bulnes Battalion and returned to Dolores with Velasquez' artillery. Both Castro and Velasquez arrived on the 19, when the allied army was already deploying in front of Sotomayor.〔Eckdahl, p. 331〕 After his return from Tana, Lt. Col. José Francisco Vergara spent great efforts in trying to convince Sotomayor to deploy the army over San Francisco Hill, instead of Santa Catalina. Vergara acknowledged the huge mistake Sotomayor was making, since the Chileans were outnumbered in a proportion of 2 to 3. The arguments became more and more violent between them, but finally about 1 am of November 19 Sotomayor gave and ordered Amunátegui to return from Santa Catalina. While at Santa Catalina, Amunátegui's cavalry captured three Argentinean scouts who informed that the whole allied army was coming from Agua Santa. At the same time, Buendía was marching to Santa Catalina, a little more west from Amunátegui's position.〔 But, the reconnaissance of both sides was very defective and the enemies weren't aware of each other. Amunátegui reached Dolores at done of the 19, and the Allies arrived shortly after. Buendía's vanguard established around the water well at Porvenir, about 1.2 kilometers south of San Francisco Hill. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Battle of San Francisco」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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